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Nichols v. United States: Defining the Proper Role of Valid
Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions in Subsequent
Sentencing Enhancement
"No! No!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-Verdict after-
wards. "--Lewis Carroll'
In 1990 Kenneth Nichols pleaded guilty to a federal charge of
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.2 At Nichols's
sentencing, the district court applied the United States Sentencing
Guidelines,3 thereby requiring an examination of Nichols's past
criminal convictions. Because his record contained a prior Georgia
misdemeanor conviction of driving while under the influence of
alcohol (DUI),4 the district court added one additional criminal
history point to Nichols's criminal history record.5 At the time of
this DUI conviction, Nichols, who was not represented by counsel,
received no prison time and a fine of only $250.6 Yet this one
additional point from the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
proved significant, because it resulted in a prison sentence on the drug
conviction that was two years longer than the maximum sentence
Nichols could have otherwise received.7
1. LEwis CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1895), reprinted in
THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 78 (Edward Guiliano ed.,
Avenel Books 1982).
2. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994). Nichols was originally
charged with a three-count indictment. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 405 (6th
Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). Count one was a charge of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine; count two was a charge of attempt to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine. Id. Both charges are violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). Nichols, 929 F.2d at 405. Count three was a charge
of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate a drug trafficking offense in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Nichols, 979 F.2d at 405. Nichols pleaded
guilty to the first count, and the remaining counts were dismissed. Id.
3. For a further explanation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, see infra
notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
4. Nichols's record also contained a 1983 federal felony drug conviction, for which
the district court assigned three criminal points. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. For a further
explanation of the criminal history point system, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text.
5. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
6. Id. At the time of this conviction, Nichols faced a maximum sentence of one year
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. Id. at 1924 n.1.
7. The additional point raised Nichols's criminal history category from Category II
to Category m. Id. at 1924. For an explanation of the criminal history category system
see infra note 54 and accompanying text. The jump in category resulted in an increase in
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In Nichols v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether such uncounseled misdemeanor convictions could be
used to enhance the sentence imposed for a later conviction.8 The
Court held that such enhancement was allowed as long as the original
uncounseled conviction was itself constitutional.9 In so holding, the
Nichols Court overruled Baldasar v. Illinois,"° a thirteen-year-old
plurality decision holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion could not be used collaterally to transform a later misdemeanor
into a felony.'
This Note reviews the Court's decision in Nicholst2 and
examines the federal sentencing guidelines,13 the case law defining
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 4 and the case law explaining
the extent to which uncounseled convictions may be used collateral-
ly." The Note then analyzes both the aftermath of Baldasar16 and
the eventual decision to overrule that case.' This Note concludes
that the Nichols decision provides the guidance to the lower courts
that Baldasar failed to provide. It then suggests a reconsideration of
the standard the Court has used to determine the constitutional right
to assigned counsel because of long-standing concerns that the holding
in Nichols has made more acute.'
At the district court level, Nichols objected to the use of his
uncounseled DUI conviction as a violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel under BaldasarY The district court rejected
the possible range of sentencing from 168-210 months to 186-235 months. Nichols, 114 S.
Ct. at 1923. Thus, when the district court sentenced Nichols to the maximum of 235
months, Nichols received 25 months of imprisonment that he would not have received if
the DUI conviction had not appeared on his record. See id. at 1924.
8. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
9. Id. at 1928.
10. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980), overruled by
Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
11. Id. at 224.
12. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 128-72 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 173-97 and accompanying text.
19. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. Nichols had sought counsel, but was advised that he
did not need a lawyer because he was planning to plead nolo contendere. Id. at 1937
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The district court found that, because of the silent record of
his DUI conviction, it could not hold that Nichols had waived his right to counsel. United
States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 278 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), affd, 979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.
1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). The Supreme Court determined that it did not need
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Nichols's argument and instead pointed to Baldasar as a fragmented
opinion that was limited to its facts.O After the court of appeals
affirmed the district court in a two-to-one decision,2' the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.2
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,'
expressly overruling Baldasar.24 The Chief Justice reasoned that the
marked splintering among both the lower federal courts and the state
courts was reason enough to reexamine the Baldasar decision.' The
Court held "that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, [that was
constitutionally valid under Scott v. Illinois6 ], is also valid when used
to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction."'27 The Court
reasoned that such "[e]nhancement statutes ... do not change the
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction .... '[They penalize] only
the last offense committed by the defendant.' "' The Court also
observed that sentencing traditionally has been "less exacting than the
process of establishing guilt"'29 and that judges have therefore been
allowed to consider a " 'wide variety of factors,' )3 including "a
defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted
from the behavior.",31  The majority also rejected the petitioner's
argument that due process requires a warning that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could be used to enhance a later sentence;
to address the issue of whether or not Nichols had waived his right to counsel because it
decided to overrule Baldasar. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924 n.4.
20. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. See infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text. The
district court read Baldasar to stand only for the proposition that uncounseled mis-
demeanor convictions could not be used to raise a later misdemeanor to a felony with a
prison term. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
21. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402,414-18 (6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921
(1994).
22. 114 S. Ct. 39 (1993).
23. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1921. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 1923.
24. Id. at 1928.
25. Id. at 1927. The Court could have upheld Baldasar, finding only its "narrowest
grounds" as binding precedent. See id at 1926 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977)). Instead the Court decided that such an inquiry would be useless in light
of the extreme confusion over the Baldasar decision. Id.
26. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). For a discussion of constitutionally valid uncounseled
misdemeanors, see infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
27. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
28. Id. at 1927 (quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1928 (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993)).
31. Id.
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the Court found that such convictions usually occur in courts that do
not maintain records, making it impossible to "memorialize any such
warnings.
' 'M
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, but argued that the
majority did not properly differentiate between a sentencing scheme
that is discretionary and one that requires automatic enhancement. 3
Justice Souter reasoned that, because the sentencing guidelines allow
judges discretion in choosing whether to count a previous conviction
as part of the criminal history record,' and because "the guidelines
allow a defendant to rebut the negative implication to which a prior
uncounseled conviction gives rise,"' the problem of reliability would
be properly addressed. 6
Justice Blackmun argued in dissent 7 that it was illogical to allow
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions that originally could not serve
as a basis for a prison sentence to be used collaterally as the basis for
extending a prison sentence.3 ' According to the dissent, whether
used directly or collaterally, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
still retain a quality of "unreliability" that should bar their use as a
basis for imprisonment. 9 Justice Blackmun also distinguished the
use of prior conduct in sentencing procedures, finding that "a record
of conviction generally carries greater weight than other evidence of
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For Justice Souter, a system
of automatic enhancement would pose a more difficult constitutional question than the
discretionary enhancement system at issue in Nichols. Id. at 1929-30 (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment). The majority, however, made no such distinction between a
discretionary and an automatic system of enhancement. See id. at 1931 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
34. Id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). The sentencing guidelines
"expressly empower the district court to depart from the range of sentences prescribed for
a criminal-history category that inaccurately captures the defendant's actual history of
criminal conduct." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter refused to offer an
opinion on a system of automatic enhancement. I&. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
37. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. at 1931
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "it also is undeniable that
Nichols's DUI conviction directly resulted in more than two years' imprisonment").
39. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reasoned: " 'An uncounseled
conviction does not become more reliable merely because the accused has been validly
convicted of a subsequent misdemeanor.' "Id. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222,227-28 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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prior conduct"'  and that prior conduct can be rebutted with
evidence, while a prior conviction cannot be so easily disavowed.4'
Understanding the decision in Nichols requires an examination
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,42 the case law defining
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,43 and the case law examining
the collateral use of uncounseled convictions.' The sentencing
guidelines were designed to further the purposes of the criminal
justice system-specifically deterrence, incapacitation, just punish-
ment, and rehabilitation. The guidelines are aimed at enhancing
"the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime throughan
effective, fair sentencing system."'  To make such a system a reality,
the Sentencing Commission sought to achieve three objectives47:
honesty-a system in which prisoners actually serve their full
sentences; uniformity-a system in which similar crimes by similar
offenders receive similar sentences;4 9 and proportionality--"a system
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity."'
Under the guidelines, which are in the form of a chart, a judge
first must assign a "basis" level for the offense that was committed,5 '
and then must determine the defendant's criminal history category.52
40. Id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
45. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COIM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, § 1A2 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The United States Sentencing
Guidelines were established by the United States Sentencing Commission with a grant of
authority from Congress under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Id. The Commission
is composed of seven voting members who not only submitted the original guidelines in
1987, but who also have the authority to submit amendments annually that will "take effect
180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(p) (1988)).
46. Id. § 1A3.
47. See i&
48. Id. This objective was obtained by taking away the parole commission's power to
determine the portion of a sentence a prisoner would actually serve. The abolition of
parole means that a prisoner will serve the actual sentene mandated by the court, with
only the possibility of an approximately 15% reduction for good behavior. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. §§ 2,3. The base offense level is assigned by the specific type of crime, but
it can vary due to specific characteristics of the offense committed. See id.
52. See id. § 4. A defendant's criminal history category is assigned by computing
points from previous convictions. Values for such convictions vary: three points for prior
sentences of imprisonment over one year and one month; two points for prior sentences
19951 1741
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The basis level, which makes up the vertical axis of the sentencing
chart, varies from one to forty-three. 3  The criminal history
category, which comprises the horizontal axis of the chart, ranges
from I to VI. 4 The sentences themselves are laid out in ranges and
are determined by using the sentencing table to find the range at
which a defendant's offense level and criminal history level inter-
sect.' The court is allowed in atypical cases to impose a sentence
outside this range, 6 but it must give specific reasons for departing
from the guidelines.5
The Sentencing Commission was initially unsure if constitutional-
ly valid uncounseled misdemeanor convictions could be used in
determining the criminal history score, and thus it left this issue to the
over 60 days (but less than one year and one month); and one point for any conviction
that is less than 60 days' imprisonment (including those that result in no imprisonment at
all). Id. § 4al.l.(a)-(c).
53. See id. §§ 2, 3. Some examples of the basis level include: first degree murder--43,
id. § 2A1.1; robbery-20, id. § 2133.1; trespass-4, id. § 2B2.3. Nichols received 34 basis
points for his drug conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
54. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4. The categories are grouped so that 0-1 criminal
history points is a Category I classification, 2-3 points--Category II, 4-6 points-Category
Im, 7-9 points-Category IV, 10-12 points-Category V, 13 or more points-Category VI.
Id.
55. Id. § 5A, comment (n.1). The greater the criminal history category or the offense
level, the greater the range of sentencing. Id. Thus a defendant with an offense level of
6 and a criminal history category of m will receive a sentence between 2 and 8 months,
while another defendant with the same offense level but in a criminal history category of
IV will receive a sentence between 6 and 12 months. See id. § 5A.
56. Id. § 1A2. The sentencing statute allows courts to sentence above or below the
sentencing range when "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in for-
mulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that prescribed."
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)); see, e.g., United States v. Fadayani, 28 F.3d 1236,
1242 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding sentence departure based on defendant's post-arrest
criminal conduct and defendant's "long-standing and extensive" fraudulent activity that
was not accounted for in the criminal history record); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d
597, 602-08 (5th Cir.) (upholding a sentence departure based on extreme conduct and a
finding that the defendant's criminal history record inadequately represented his propensity
for future crime), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989).
57. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 1A2. A listing of the reasons for such departures is
required so that the appellate court can review any departure for reasonableness. See id.;
see also, e.g., United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745,751 (9th Cir. 1991) (vacating and
remanding defendant's sentence because of the district court's failure to provide reasons
for a departure from the 0-6 month range to a sentence of 36 months); United States v.
Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the district court's departure from
the guidelines was unreasonable because there was no evidence of unusual circumstances
that warranted such a departure).
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courts. 8 In 1990, however, the Commission amended. the guidelines
to read: "Prior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted
in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor
sentences where imprisonment was not imposed." 9
Though the sentencing guidelines allow the use of uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions in determining the criminal history record,
only constitutionally valid convictions may be used. To be valid
under the Constitution, such uncounseled convictions must meet the
requirements of the Sixth' and Fourteenth Amendments.6' These
two Amendments form the framework within which the Court has
determined the scope of the right to counsel.62 One of the early
cases in which the Court began to explore this issue was Powell v.
Alabama.63
The Supreme Court in Powell held that assignment of counsel is
necessary in a capital case when the defendant is unable to employ
counsel and is incapable of adequately defending himself because of
"ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy or the like."'  The Court
ruled that a failure to provide effective counsel was a violation of the
defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.65
Reasoning that the right to counsel is of such a "fundamental
character" that it must be "included in the conception of due process
of law,",66  the Court recognized that even an "intelligent and
58. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, app. C n.353. The guidelines formerly stated that "if
to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States
Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in the criminal history score." Id.
59. Id.
60. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
61. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. Some hold the view that the original right to counsel was merely a guarantee that
the federal government would not block a defendant from hiring an attorney. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (citing WILLIAM MERRrrr
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-30 (1955)),
63. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell four "ignorant and illiterate" black youths were
convicted of the capital rape of two white girls on a train bound for Scottsboro, Alabama.
Id. at 50-52.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)). The Court
reached this determination after tracing the history of the right to counsel. See id; at
60-68. Historically, the right to counsel in England was limited to civil cases and
misdemeanor offenses and not allowed for more serious felony offenses. Id at 60. The
1995] 1743
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educated layman". lacks the expertise in the law necessary to prove his
case effectively at trial.' As the Court stated, the defendant
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him."'
While the language in Powell limited its holding to the particular
facts and circumstances of the case,69 the Court did not specifically
expand the right to counsel to fully encompass all defendants in state
felony trials until thirty-one years later.7°  In Gideon v.
Wainwright' the Court found that representation by counsel was so
fundamental in assuring a fair trial that the states were obligated to
provide counsel for indigents.O Yet the Court did not fully define
colonies rejected this, though, and "in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of
the English Common Law... had been fully rejected and the right to counsel fully
recognized in all criminal prosecutions." Id. at 64-65.
67. Id. at 69. Such legal expertise may come into play at any step throughout the trial
process. As the Court noted:
If charged with a crime, [the defendant] is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a
perfect one.
Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 71; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
70. Between the Gideon and Powell decisions, the Court held in Belts v. Brady that
"appointed counsel is not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial" and thus the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process did not make appointment of counsel
to indigent defendants obligatory on the states. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72
(1942). This ruling was explicitly reconsidered and overruled in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
71. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon was convicted of the Florida felony
of breaking and entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id. at 336.
The trial court refused Gideon's request for assigned counsel on the grounds that assigned
counsel is only necessary in capital cases. Without counsel, Gideon was sentenced to five
years' imprisonment. Id. at 337.
72. See id. at 340-45. The Court focused not only on the earlier precedents of Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), but also on
the policy ground that counsel is necessary to a fair system of justice. Gideon, 372 U.S.
at 342-44. It reasoned:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice... [g]overnments, both state and
federal, spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime.... [T]here are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed,
who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get.... [These examples] are the
strongest indications that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries.... [Our society has] laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with a crime has to face his accuser without a lawyer to assist
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the breadth of its decision. Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence
that he believed the ruling applied to cases in which there was a "po-
ssibility of a substantial prison sentence,"'73 leaving open the question
of whether the new rule of providing indigents with counsel should
extend to other, less serious crimes.74
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court established a standard to
measure the necessity of assigning counsel.75 The Court ruled that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches in any case in which
the "accused is deprived of his liberty."76  The Court deemed
imprisonment to be inherently different and more severe than any
other type of punishment.77 The Court also expressed a distrust in
the reliability of the entire process for adjudicating misdemeanors
because it feared that cases were forced through the system in an
"assembly line" fashion.7 In the end, the Court recognized that its
ruling was limited to instances in which loss of liberty occurred, and
thus declined to answer the question of whether counsel was required
in cases in which a jail sentence may be authorized by statute, but
none is actually imposed.79
Seven years later, the Court addressed the question left open by
Argersinger, ruling in Scott v. Illinois' that the Sixth Amendment
him.
Id. at 344.
73. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
75. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For nine years after Gideon the Court refused to review cases
that raised the issue of whether the right to counsel pronounced in Gideon applied to
misdemeanors. For a list of such cases see David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of
Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions After Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517,
523 n.27 (1981-82).
76. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32-37. In so holding, the Court refused to acknowledge
any distinction between the use of the terms "felony," "misdemeanor" or "petty offense."
See id. at 37. By drawing a line at cases that result in imprisonment, the Court allowed
for differences in state classifications of offenses. See id. at 38.
77. See id. at 32-34; accord Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979). But see
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 47-48 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (arguing that some
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction are just as severe as imprisonment).
78. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34-37 ("An inevitable consequence of volume that large
is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases. The
calendar is long, speed often is substituted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court
compromise too often is substituted for adjudication." (quoting The Report by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967))).
79. Id. at 37.
80. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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right to counsel extends only to "actual imprisonment. 8 1  Because
the Court followed the reasoning of Argersinger that imprisonment
was inherently different from other punishments,' it was able to
justify drawing the line at cases in which the defendant actually
received a sentence that involved imprisonment.' In doing this, the
Court expressed concern that extending the right to counsel beyond
"actual imprisonment" would be too demanding upon local and state
courts." Thus, the Court established the rule that uncounseled
misdemeanors are constitutionally valid, so long as they do not result
in a jail sentence.'
Unfortunately for defendants, convictions may have ramifications
other than just immediate punishment. The United States Sentencing
Guidelines 6 and many states' criminal statutes87 provide for the
collateral use of previous convictions to enhance the sentence imposed
for a current conviction. This enhancement means that a "person
with a prior conviction [who] chooses to commit a subsequent crime
... becomes subject to the increased penalty prescribed for the
second crime."'  The sentencing guidelines use a person's prior
criminal history in the sentencing scheme because of a belief that
prior history is "directly relevant" for the purposes of proper
punishment, deterrence, public protection, and correctional treatment.8 9
81. Id. at 373. But cf id. at 382-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for an
"authorized imprisonment" standard requiring counsel every time a defendant is
prosecuted for a crime which, by statute, carries the possibility of imprisonment).
82. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
83. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
84. Id. at 372-73. The Court was concerned that "[ajny extension would create
confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverie
States." Id.
85. See i. at 373-74. Scott represents the current state of the law regarding when a
constitutional right to counsel attaches under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendmepts.
86. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4; see supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
87. For an example of one such state recidivist statute, see infra note 94 and accom-
panying text.
88. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4A, Introductory Commentary. The Sentencing
Commission's belief in criminal history as a gauge for punishment can be seen in the
following:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of
criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated
criminal behavior will aggravate tjie need for punishment with each recurrence.
To protect the public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the
likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered.
Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful
rehabilitation.
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Prior to the creation of the sentencing guidelines and after
Gideon, the Court decided the extent to which an unconstitutional,
uncounseled felony conviction could be used collaterally. In Burgett
v. Texas" the Court concluded that "[t]o permit a conviction
obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a
person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense ... is to erode the principle of that case."'" The Court
viewed any conviction that violated Gideon as "constitutionally
infirm," and therefore unable to be used collaterally in any manner.'
Burgett effectively answered the question of whether uncounseled
unconstitutional convictions could be used collaterally for enhan-
cement, but the Court still had not decided whether uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions that are valid under Scott were also valid for
collateral use. The Court faced this issue in Baldasar v. Illinois,'
which concerned an Illinois recidivist statute that treated a second
conviction of petty theft as a felony.94 The defendant, Thomas
Baldasar, without the aid of counsel, was originally convicted of
misdemeanor theft and was fined $159.' 5 Six months later, Baldasar
was charged with stealing a $29 shower head.96 In the jury trial that
followed, Baldasar received a felony conviction under the Illinois
enhancement statute.97
The Supreme Court then reversed Baldasar's felony conviction
by issuing a brief per curiam opinion. The per curiam opinion was
merely a recitation of the facts and a statement that the lower court's
decision was reversed "[flor the reasons stated in the concurring
Id.
90. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
91. Id. at 115 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,448-49
(1972) (holding that a judge's possible consideration of uncounseled unconstitutional
convictions was enough to warrant a remand for sentencing).
92. See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115.
93. 446 U.S. 222 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980), overruled by Nichols
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
94. Id. at 223. The Illinois statute made a theft "not from the person" of property
worth less than $150 a misdemeanor that was punishable by not more than one year
imprisonment and a $1000 fine. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-3(a)(1),
1005-9-1(a)(2) (1975). For a second conviction of the same offense, the statute provided
for the conviction to be treated as a felony with a possible prison term of one to three
years. Id. para. 1005-8-1(b)(5).
95. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223. Baldasar's uncounseled conviction was constitutionally
valid under Scott because no jail sentence was imposed. See supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
96. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
97. Id.; see supra note 94.
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opinions.""8 Justice Stewart wrote a very brief concurrence stating
that the Illinois statute violated Scott because it allowed "an increased
term of imprisonment only because [the defendant] had been
convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense."'  Justice Marshall
added that the increased sentence that Baldasar received because of
the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction constituted "actual imprison-
ment," and was thus unconstitutional under Scott."° He reasoned
that uncounseled convictions that are constitutional under Scott are
not constitutionally valid for all purposes; specifically, such convictions
are "invalid for the purpose of depriving [the defendant] of his liber-
ty. 1 1  Therefore, according to Justice Marshall, an uncounseled
conviction is invalid for sending the defendant to jail either directly
on the first conviction, or collaterally on the later conviction.1 2
Justice Blackmun wrote a third and distinct concurring opinion,
reiterating his dissent in Scott.' By not accepting Scott as control-
ling precedent, Justice Blackmun limited the Baldasar decision to less
than majority status because he never determined that Baldasar was
a violation of Scott, as the other concurring opinions had held. The
final result was a plurality with four concurring justices finding a
violation of Scott, four dissenting justices finding no violation of Scott,
and Justice Blackmun never directly addressing the Scott issue." 4
98. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun all wrote
separate concurring opinions. Justices Brennan and Stevens joined both Justice Stewart's
and Justice Marshall's opinions. Id. at 224, 229. Because the per curiam opinion is void
of any rationale, the precedential value of Baldasar must be found in the concurring
opinions.
99. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 225-26 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373 (1979)).
101. Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 228-29 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated:
An uncounseled conviction does not become more reliable merely because the
accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent offense. For this reason, a
conviction which is invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of imprisonment
for the offense itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of
imprisonment for a subsequent conviction under a repeat-offender statute.
Id. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,389-90
(1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that a "bright line" test of six months of
statutorily authorized imprisonment should be the proper standard by which the right to
counsel should be measured)).
104. See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The four dissenting Justices were
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Id. at 230.
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The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Powell, rejected the
idea that "enhancement equals imprisonment for the earlier of-
fense."'"5 The dissent also reasoned that because unconstitutional
uncounseled convictions after Gideon were invalid for enhancement,
constitutional uncounseled convictions after Scott should be valid for
enhancement."°6 The dissent also labeled Justice Marshall's view
that some convictions are not valid for all purposes as "hybrid,"
expressing special concern that the decision in Baldasar would "create
confusion"'" and would leave "the courts that try misdemeanor
cases daily [without] clear guidance from this Court."' °8
The dissent's view proved prophetic, as demonstrated by the
struggle of both state and lower federal courts to interpret Bal-
dasar." The confusion and fragmentation over the actual meaning
of Baldasar made it a prime candidate for reconsideration.1 °
Typically, a fragmented decision like Baldasar, in which no single
rationale carries the assent of five Justices, is given the precedential
value of "that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgmentf] on the narrowest grounds.""' Yet because Justice
Blackmun started with a different premise than the other four
concurring justices,"' some lower courts concluded that Baldasar did
not contain a "narrowest ground[]" that could serve as precedent."'
Those courts that could not find a cbmmon denominator among
Baldasar's concurring opinions often limited the judgment to its strict
facts; the district court and the Sixth Circuit took this approach in
105. Id. at 234 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that "[t]hese [enhancement
statutes], commonplace in our criminal justice system, do not alter or enlarge a prior
sentence." Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. See id at 232-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 234 (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
110. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
111. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).
112. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding no "common denominator" on which the Baldasar concurring Justices agreed),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993); United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 219 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1990) (noting no "common agreement" by the concurring justices in Baldasar);
Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341,345 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Baldasar
"provides little guidance outside of the precise factual context in which it arose"), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1 (9th
Cir.) (noting that "the Court in Baldasar divided in such a way that no rule can be said
to have resulted"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
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Nichols.1 4 Yet some courts had moved to the other extreme and
held that Baldasar prohibited any imprisonment in a subsequent
conviction imposed on the basis of an uncounseted misdemeanor
conviction." 5
The confusion of the lower courts over Baldasar is evident in the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Santillanes v. United States Parole
Comm'n."6 This court found the narrowest grounds, and thus the
holding in Baldasar, to be "Justice Blackmun's rationale."'1 7 This
is troublesome because Justice Blackmun's opinion was the only
single-Justice opinion"' and had as its starting point the rejection of
the binding precedent of Scott."9 The Santillanes court further
concluded that Baldasar stands for both the strict rule "that an invalid
uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance a subsequent
conviction" and that "[i]f the prior conviction was valid, it can be used
[collaterally] even though it was uncounseled.""' The idea that as
long as a conviction is valid it may be used collaterally lies instead at
the heart of the Baldasar dissent, however, and not behind Justice
Blackmun's view.'2'
State courts were just as divided over the meaning of Baldasar.
Some found that Baldasar completely bars any prior uncounseled
misdemeanor from enhancing a term of imprisonment," while
others found Baldasar no bar at all to using a valid, uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction collaterally." Taking a position between
these two extremes, other states concluded that Baldasar bars an
enhanced penalty only when such penalty is greater than that
authorized in the absence of the prior uncounseled offense, or when
114. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d at
500 (ruling that Baldasar is not appropriate when the second conviction is already a
felony); Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used to enhance a later misdemeanor to
a felony).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989).
116. 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985).
117. Id. at 889.
118. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980),
overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
119. See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120. Santillanes, 754 F.2d at 889-90.
121. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318,320 (Ark. 1984); State v. Vares, 801 P.2d
555, 557 (Haw. 1990); State v. Black, 277 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (N.C. App. 1981).
123. See, e.g., Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990).
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it would convert a misdemeanor to a felony.24 A fourth approach
applied by other states follows Justice Blackmun's concurrence and
limits the use of valid uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to those
for which any statutorily-authorized imprisonment was limited to less
than six months."2
The confusion resulting from Baldasar was not limited to the
courts, but also was shared by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
Originally, the Sentencing Commission was concerned that the
calculation of the criminal history category could violate Baldasar if
an uncounseled misdemeanor was used in the sentencing deter-
mination.'26 Yet in 1990, the guidelines were amended to specifical-
ly include prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, thus reflecting
the Sentencing Commission's belief that the application of Baldasar
was limited to its facts. 27
The standard that developed in the wake of Baldasar warranted
Supreme Court review, which was finally accorded in Nichols v.
United States.'2 In Nichols, the Court concluded that the logical
consequence of the validity of uncounseled misdemeanors under Scott
is that such convictions will still be valid for collateral use to enhance
a later prison sentence. 29 This is a thorough rejection of Justice
Marshall's "hybrid" approach in Baldasar, under which valid
uncounseled convictions were not a valid basis for a jail sentence,
whether imposed directly or collaterally.3
Indeed, Justice Marshall's position in Baldasar that the "actual
imprisonment" standard of Scott v. Illinois eliminated the collateral
use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to impose a later prison
term may have advanced that standard beyond the Court's actual
124. See, e.g., State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340, 1347 (NJ.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 967
(1990).
125. See, e.g., Ilad v. State, 565 So. 2d 762,764-66 (Fla. App. 1990), affd, 585 So. 2d
928, 930 (Fla. 1991); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (N.D. 1985).
126. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. When the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission originally proposed this amendment for note and comment, it included the
following background commentary: "The Commission does not believe the inclusion of
sentences resulting from constitutionally valid, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in
the criminal history score is foreclosed by Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)." 55
FED. REG. 5741 (1990).
128. 114 S. Ct. 1921,1926 (1994). But see id. at 1932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a common ground exists in Baldasar and thus precedent can be found in the decision).
129. Id. at 1927.
130. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (Marshall, L, concurring); see supra
notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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holding in Scott."3 In. Scott the Court was only dealing with a
situation in which the defendant had directly received a fine for an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.' Also, in Scott the uncoun-
seled conviction analyzed by the Court resulted in a direct sen-
tence, 3 3 whereas the uncounseled convictions in both Nichols and
Baldasar were collateral to the sentences in dispute." 4 In Nichols
and Baldasar the difference was that the defendants needed a subse-
quent conviction for a later offense when counsel was provided. 35
By allowing enhancement based on a valid uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction, Nichols remains truer than the Baldasar
judgment to the traditional conception of sentencing envisioned by the
Sentencing Commission.36 Chief Justice Rehnquist considered this
theme in Nichols when he stated that, "[a]s a general proposition, a
sentencing judge 'may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in
scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may
consider, or the source from which it may come.' ""3 This inquiry
allows for the consideration of a defendant's past criminal behavior
that did not result in a criminal conviction. 38  This prior conduct,
though, needs only to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
which is less stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
that must be met at all criminal trials, even those in which the
defendant is without the assistance of counsel. 39
Besides being more consistent with the traditional theory of
sentencing than the Baldasar judgment was, Nichols also is more
131. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
132. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979).
133. See i
134. See supra notes 2-7, 95-97 and accompanying text.
135. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]f, as in this
case, a person with a prior conviction chooses to commit a subsequent crime, he thereby
becomes subject to the increased penalty prescribed for the second crime"). But see
Rudstein, supra note 75, at 533 (arguing that the defendant is imprisoned due to the
previous uncounseled conviction and that there is no difference between a direct jail
sentence and a collateral enhancement of a jail sentence).
136. For a discussion of the Sentencing Commission's view of sentencing, see supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
137. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446
(1972)). The United States Sentencing Guidelines make an allowance for factors other
than prior convictions. These factors allow the judge to move a defendant's criminal
histoiy record either up or down. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4A1.3.
138. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
139. IL But see id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that considering prior
conduct differs from prior convictions because defendant can rebut evidence of prior
conduct).
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consistent with the precedent of Burgett v. Texas' than the
"hybrid" conviction idea. Burgett made uncounseled felony convic-
tions invalid for the purpose of sentence enhancement because they
were themselves unconstitutional under Gideon'4' Yet in Nichols,
the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was constitutional, so by
looking to the converse of Burgett, the conviction also should have
been valid for enhancement. 2 It is more consistent-a major goal
of the Sentencing Commission 43-- to deem a prior conviction either
valid or invalid for all purposes, instead of transforming previously
valid convictions into invalid ones in certain circumstances.144
While the Court's logic in Nichols is more consistent with both
the earlier precedent and the general concept of sentencing than is the
"hybrid conviction" idea proposed by both Justice Blackmun in his
Nichols dissent 45 and Justice Marshall in his Baldasar concur-
rence," the underlying difference between the holding of Nichols
and the "hybrid conviction" idea of Justice Blackmun stems from
different views of what the criminal justice system is punishing when
it enhances a subsequent conviction on the basis of a prior convic-
tion. 47 Both Justice Blackmun (in his Nichols dissent) and Justice
Marshall (in his Baldasar concurrence) explicitly stated that these are
140. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
141. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
142. But see Rudstein, supra note 75, at 534 (arguing that the key to Burgett is the
uncounseled nature of the conviction, and thus Burgett is consistent with the conception
of a "hybrid" conviction).
143. Consistency in sentencing is directly related to the Commission's goals of
uniformity and proportionality. The ability to hand out like punishments to like offenders
allows for accurate predictions of sentences. A system that is consistent in giving out
stiffer punishment for repeat offenders will serve as a greater deterrent than a system that
is inconsistent in its application. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
144. See Lily Fu, Note, High Crimes From Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior
Uncounseled Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REv. 167, 191 (1992) (arguing that convictions are
more "logically binary"-a person is either guilty or innocent-and thus splitting
convictions into different classes of validity is "conceptually contrived").
145. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1936 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
147. Compare Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927 (stating that "[e]nhancement statutes ...
[and] recidivist statutes... do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction")
and Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]hese [recidivist and
enhancement statutes] ... do not alter or enlarge a prior sentence") with Nichols, 114 S.
Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that it is "undeniable" that an earlier
conviction "directly resulted" in a larger prison sentence) and Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227
(Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the later sentence was the "direct consequence" of
the first conviction).
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not cases of enlarging the original sentence,'" but then use language
to the contrary.49 Both Justices knew that recidivist statutes had
long been upheld as not violating double jeopardy,' yet they built
their arguments on a fear that the defendant is being punished later
for an earlier crime. Justices Marshall and Blackmun, though, were
forced into this questionable line of reasoning because they had to
acknowledge the precedent of Scott v. Illinois,"' despite their
continued objection to that decision. 52 By arguing against the later
use of uncounseled convictions valid under Scott, they attempted to
lessen the value and effectiveness of the "actual imprisonment"
standard stated there. 53
Several problems would arise if the type of system advocated by
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, in which valid uncounseled convic-
tions cannot be used to enhance a later sentence, were implemented.
The first is that recidivist statutes would be made less effective. The
United States Sentencing Commission noted this when it revised the
guidelines in 1990 and stated that valid uncounseled misdemeanors
should be considered, because without them "the criminal history
score [might] not adequately reflectf the defendant's failure to learn
from the application of previous sanctions." '154 Recidivist statutes,
holding repeat offenders to a higher degree of culpability, would by
nature lose effectiveness if a valid conviction could not be considered.
Another problem would arise from the fact that most valid
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions occur in courts that do not
keep comprehensive records. 55 Defendants could be encouraged to
lie and to claim they had been without counsel. Because the Court
has held that a silent record raises a presumption that the defendant
148. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is undeniable
that recidivist statutes do not impose a second punishment for the first offense"); Baldasar,
446 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that "increased prison sentences in this
case is not an enlargement of the sentence for the original offense").
149. See supra note 147.
150. See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673,
676-77 (1895).
151. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
152. See Baldasar, 476 U.S. at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that he "remain[s]
convinced that [Scott] was wrongly decided"); id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(arguing that adoption of his own dissent in Scott would warrant reversal of the case at
bar); see also Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1932 n.1 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (noting his own
dissent in Scott).
153. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1992) (arguing that Baldasar"ameliorated" the harsh effects of Scott).
154. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, app. C n.353.
155. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
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was both without counsel and had not waived such right to coun-
sel," 6 a defendant who lies at a later proceeding will be rewarded
with a less severe sentence.
The decision in Nichols solves these problems5 7 and resolves
the fragmentation that occurred in the lower courts after Bal-
dasar 8 However, the Nichols decision raises several policy con-
cerns that have been reiterated during the Court's development of its
right to counsel jurisprudence. Many of these concerns developed
due to the "actual imprisonment" standard imposed in Scott v.
Illinois.5 9
One concern that has been expressed over the "actual imprison-
ment" standard for determining when counsel is constitutionally
required is that it fails to take into account other consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction that may be just as serious as a sentence of
immediate imprisonment."6 Nichols shows that one consequence
may be a later enhancement to a subsequent conviction. Such an
enhancement can result in a sentence several years longer than an
unenhanced sentence.' There are also other possible consequen-
ces. For example, in a case in which an individual's livelihood
depends on the ability to drive, the suspension of a license to operate
a motor vehicle could be more burdensome than spending several
days in jail.62 The community stigma and the negative effects on
employment associated with a criminal sentence are just some of the
possible effects that a misdemeanor conviction may have.6
A second concern is that the "actual imprisonment" standard in
certain cases forces a judge to determine a likely sentence even before
a trial begins."6 These cases are ones in which a judge has before
her an indigent defendant who faces a misdemeanor charge that
156. See Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
157. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
159. For an explanation of the "actual imprisonment" standard see supra notes 80-85
and accompanying text.
160. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47-48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) ("Serious
consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment").
161. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
162. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (citing Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)).
163. For a sampling of cases involving other potential serious effects of a criminal
conviction, see Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 n.11 (Powell, 3., concurring in the result).
164. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., concurring); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 42
(Burger, C.J., concurring in the result).
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statutorily authorizes imprisonment as a possible sentence. If the
judge does not assign counsel, she "will be compelled to forgo the
legislatively granted option' to impose a sentence of imprisonment
upon conviction."" Problems could result if the judge does not
appoint counsel in such a case and then decides as the trial develops
that imprisonment is the only proper sentence for this defendant. At
this point the judge's hands are tied, and it seems likely that the judge
will be forced to impose a lesser sentence than she would like to
simply because she must now comply with the "actual imprisonment"
standard of Scott v. Illinois.166
A third concern, not mentioned in the majority opinion of
Nichols, relates to the reliability of misdemeanor convictions, an issue
first identified in Argersinger v. Hamlin. 67 The fear of assembly
line justice where "[e]verything is rush, rush"'1' is apparently no
longer of concern to the Court after the Nichols decision. 69 The
Nichols Court probably followed the assumption that Justice Powell
made in his Baldasar dissent that "the uncounseled conviction is
conceded to be .valid and thus must be presumed reliable." ' Yet
in the hasty misdemeanor criminal justice system, constitutional
validity as determined by the Court may not coincide with the policy
concern of reliability. Reliability is based on a fear that the innocent
165. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53
(Powell, J., concurring in the result) (indicating a fear that judges will create their own
categories of offenses that are imprisonable and thus will overrule de facto the legislature's
determination of the proper range of sentencing).
166. 440 U.S. at 372-73; see supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
167. 407 U.S. 25, 34-37 (1972); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
168. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 35 (quoting William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the
Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 THE LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 151,152 (1970)).
169. While the majority in Nichols completely neglected the issue of reliability, Justice
Blackmun's dissent attempted to frame the issue solely on the basis of reliability. 114 S.
Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). While Justice Blackmun effectively pointed out the
risks of unreliability in the absence of counsel, id. at 1935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
his refraining of the issue entirely on reliability grounds sidestepped the problem that the
"hybrid conviction" view is based on a fear that enhancement statutes punish defendants
later for earlier convictions, see id. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In any event, our
concern here is not with multiple punishments, but with reliability."); see supra notes
145-53 and accompanying text. Such a view of enhancement statutes would seem to
violate double jeopardy, yet the Court has previously rejected this limited view of
enhancement statutes. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
170. Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222,234 n.2 (1980) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell may even go beyond simply presuming reliability from validity by suggesting that
misdemeanor convictions are just as reliable as felony convictions. Justice Powell notes
that "[ilt cannot be denied ... that the issues in the great majority of misdemeanor cases
are not complicated and the facts often are not in dispute." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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may be steam-rolled through the system,' while validity is a
determination by the Court as to what the Constitution allows. The
two may exist independent of one another, and thus the reliability of
a previous conviction should still be questioned.72
The three concerns raised by Nichols' could all be resolved by
a future reconsideration of the "actual imprisonment" standard.
Although the petitioner in Nichols argued in the alternative for a
reconsideration of the "actual imprisonment" standard,7 the Court
never addressed this argument, and it was not briefed by the
respondent. The first concern-that some consequences of a
conviction are more serious than a jail sentence' 7 5-arises because
the "actual imprisonment" standard fails to take these consequences
into account. By extending the line at which counsel is constitutional-
ly required too far, any consequence other than imprisonment is
disregarded. Instead, a standard of "authorized imprisonment" as
proposed by Justice Brennan in Scott v. Illinois,'76 under which
counsel would be appointed so long as the charge has the statutory
possibility of imprisonment,'" would actually serve as a better
171. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34-36.
172. For instance, reliability may be questioned in instances in which it is cheaper for
a defendant to plead guilty and pay a fine than it is to hire an attorney and attempt to
prove his innocence. Justice Souter recognized these instances in his concurrence in
Nichols. 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 33-36
and accompanying text. Justice Souter's declaration that the sentencing guidelines provide
the necessary flexibility to allow the defendant "to convince the sentencing court of the
unreliability of any prior valid but uncounseled convictions" may be misplaced. Nichols,
114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). The sentencing guidelines
themselves suggest "despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they
will not do so very often." U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 1A4.b. The Commission believes
departures will become rarer as the guidelines develop over time and take into account
all the factors sentencing judges may face. Id. Commentators have criticized this growth
of the guidelines which is aimed at limiting the need for discretion. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681,1690,1730-40 (1992) (arguing that the federal
guidelines are too rigid, complex, and severe and that appellate courts have been
narrow-minded in applying the guidelines); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 899, 905 (1992)
(arguing that the guidelines are unnecessarily complex and confusing, and that they result
in a federal bureaucracy of sentencing that is void of judicial discretion). The development
of the guidelines may ultimately foreclose to a defendant the argument that a previous
conviction is unreliable.
173. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
174. Brief for Petitioner at 36-44, Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994) (No. 92-8556).
175. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
176. 440 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1979)
177. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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indicator of the stigma and collateral consequences that may attach to
a conviction." For example, the stigma attached to a minor traffic
conviction that carried no chance of imprisonment is quite different
from that of a driving-while-intoxicated conviction that carried the
possibility of a jail sentence, but which was never imposed. The
"authorized imprisonment" standard takes such discrepancies into
account much more effectively than the "actual imprisonment"
standard.
An "authorized imprisonment" standard also would eliminate the
second concern-that the "actual imprisonment" standard restricts the
sentencing judge unnecessarily.'79 At the initial stages the judge,
prosecutor, and defendant would know if the defendant is entitled to
counsel simply by looking to the statute under which the defendant
is charged. Not only would such a procedure be easier, it would also
eliminate the need for potentially lengthy pre-trial conferences
between the judge and prosecutor as to whether the Constitution
requires assigning counsel for an indigent defendant.
The third problem, that of reliability, would also be alleviated by
an "authorized imprisonment" standardlm In Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, counsel was viewed as the solution to unreliable misdemeanor
convictions.18 ' Because of this any expansion of the right to counsel
would serve to lessen the fear that an innocent defendant would be
found guilty." It is undisputed that the "authorized imprisonment"
standard would provide a much broader right to counsel than the
current "actual imprisonment" standard. This would provide more
defendants facing misdemeanor charges with counsel, thereby
increasing reliability.
Yet providing more defendants with counsel also breathes new
life into the primary objection to the "authorized imprisonment"
178. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 70 (1976) (arguing that appointment of counsel in all cases
where imprisonment is permissible is the best way effectively to meet the concern for a fair
trial, a concern that operates irrespective of the consequences).
179. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
181. 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
182. The Argersinger Court noted that those facing misdemeanor charges are five times
more likely to have all charges dismissed if represented by counsel. 407 U.S. at 36 (citing
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, Preliminary
Report 1 (1970)). This fear of unreliability, though, probably can never be fully eliminated
due simply to the nature of the misdemeanor system. Also, a defendant who is not
deemed indigent may nevertheless be unable to afford an attorney, and thus may feel
pressured to plea merely to resolve the case in a speedy, less-costly fashion.
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standard, specifically that it is unworkable and overburdens an already
overloaded court system."s This fear of great economic expense
caused by the need for additional attorneys induced the Scott Court
to draw the line for the right to counsel at "actual imprisonment,"' 4
yet this was a departure from the Court's previous rulings in Powell,
Gideon, and Argersinger. In Argersinger the Court noted that it did
not have doubts over the sufficiency of the nation's legal resources to
meet the expansion of the right to counsel.' 5  Gideon also
dramatically increased the right to counsel without fear of severe
economic impact.Y Thus, drawing the line at "actual imprisonment"
on economic grounds was a departure from the previous reasoning
used by the Court in determining the right to counsel.Y
The economic argument can also be questioned in light of the
fact that a large majority of states already recognize a right to counsel
that is more expansive than the federal right.s Of this majority, a
large number already recognize a right to counsel that is equal to or
greater than the "authorized imprisonment" standard.'89 These
states make up a large percentage of the nation's population and are
diverse in terms of urban and rural environments.Y The fact that
these states are still able to operate their criminal justice systems
effectively is proof that an "authorized imprisonment" rule governing
the right to counsel is workable.
183. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
184. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
185. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 n.7; id at 44 (Burger, Ci., concurring in the result)
(stating that "[t]he holding of the Court today may well add lafge new burdens on a
profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to
the burdens placed on it").
186. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 389-45 (1963) (failing to mention any
economic ramifications of the rule enunciated); see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 384 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (stating that the "Court's rule in enforcing constitutional guarantees for
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions of state
governments").
187. See GARCIA, supra note 153, at 12 (noting the paradoxical nature of the Court's
rejection of an economic burdens argument in Argersinger and acceptance of the same
argument in Scott).
188. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 385-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Nichols, 114 S. Ct.
at 1928 n.12 (recognizing that states may individually decide to provide counsel "for all
indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors").
189. For a complete list of the states allowing a greater right to counsel, see Scott, 440
U.S. at 388 nn.18-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a list of those states with an
"authorized imprisonment" standard for the right to counsel, see id. at 388 n.18 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The "actual imprisonment" standard also seems to be at odds
with the exact wording of the Sixth Amendment, which applies to "all
criminal prosecutions. '"'9 The spirit of Powell, Gideon, and Arger-
singer was a recognition that counsel was a necessary ingredient in
assuring a fair trial. The same concerns expressed in Gideon and
Powell for a defendant's rights exist even if a conviction will not
necessarily end in a jail sentence.
The decision in Nichols v. United States was necessary to provide
the lower courts with the guidance that had been lacking since
Baldasar v. Illinois."' The Nichols decision, by accepting
constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor convictions as valid
for collateral purposes, is both logically consistent and consistent with
the Sentencing Commission's ideals in sentencing."9 Yet in light of
the Nichols decision, new questions have arisen concerning the
Court's decision in Scott v. Illinois that uncounseled convictions are
constitutional so long as there is no "actual imprisonment."'94 The
logical consistency of Nichols can be maintained 95 and the policy
concerns of the "actual imprisonment" standard'96 eliminated by an
adoption of the "authorized imprisonment" standard."9 In fact, if
the Scott Court had originally adopted the "authorized imprisonment"
standard, the dispute over the proper use of valid uncounseled
convictions that was posed in Nichols and Baldasar would never have
arisen.
JOSEPH NICHOLAS FROEHLICH
191. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
192. See 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980), overruled
by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994); see also supra notes 109-25 and accom-
panying text. Lower courts have found that applying Nichols is much easier than
discerning the meaning of Baldasar. See, e.g., United States v. Witzel, No. 93-50494,1994
WL 465868, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (following Nichols and dismissing defendant's
challenge to the collateral use of constitutionally valid uncounseled convictions for driving
while license suspended); United States v. Severe, 29 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
No. 94-6889,1994 WL 664295 (U.S. 1994) (following Nichols and foreclosing argument that
constitutionally valid uncounseled conviction cannot be used for sentencing enhancement
purposes); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 153 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (following the
logic of Nichols and holding that a constitutional non-jury juvenile offense can be validly
used for sentence enhancement).
193. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
194. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); see supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
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